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DESIGNING A COMPENSATED–KIDNEY
DONATION SYSTEM
T. RANDOLPH BEARD*
JIM LEITZEL**
I
INTRODUCTION
One of the barriers to ending the prohibition on compensated organ
donations is that people do not have a good idea what a legal, compensated
system would look like. The ban on compensation is nearly global, and has
existed, de facto or de jure, almost since the development of
immunosuppressive drugs made donations from unrelated individuals feasible.
The resulting dearth of first-hand knowledge of a working system that involves
compensated donations helps to sustain the prohibition on “valuable
1
consideration,” despite the huge morbidity and mortality costs associated with
2
the persistent and growing organ shortage. Resistance to compensation is
further bolstered by (understandable) revulsion at what an unregulated, highly
3
commercialized market in human organs would likely involve. Media reports of
the existing “unregulated” organ market—that is, of the largely illegal black
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”).
2. Data on the U.S. kidney waiting list are available from the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation
Network.
Data,
U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
3. The resistance to paid donors should not be overstated. A February 2012 poll of 3000 U.S.
adults found that more than sixty percent supported health-care credits to compensate organ donors,
and more than forty percent favored monetary compensation. See THOMSON REUTERS-NPR,
Executive Summary to ORGAN DONATION COMPENSATION (2012). Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth
also find majority approval for kidney sales. S. Leider & A.E. Roth, Kidneys for Sale: Who
Disapproves, and Why?, 10 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1221, 1221 (2010). In a 2008 survey of transplant
surgeons, James R. Rodrigue and coauthors reported that a majority were opposed to cash payments
for kidneys, though some forms of compensation received majority support. J.R. Rodrigue et al.,
Stimulus for Organ Donation: A Survey of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons Membership, 9
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2172, 2172 (2009).
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market for transplants—help to stoke that revulsion. At the same time, the vast
majority of people on the waiting list for organs in the United States are waiting
for kidneys. The queue for kidneys lengthens continually, with horrific results.
Every year, thousands of people in the United States lose their lives for want of
a working kidney. The situation for older patients is especially dire. As the title
of a journal article from 2009 puts it, Half of Kidney Transplant Candidates
Who Are Older than 60 Years Now Placed on the Waiting List Will Die before
5
Receiving a Deceased-Donor Transplant.
Reform advocates have developed various blueprints detailing methods for
incorporating compensation into legal, regulated organ exchanges—exchanges
that would bear little relationship to a laissez-faire bazaar, or to current black
6
markets. Nevertheless, no single compensation proposal seems to have become
focal, nor has the perception of a rather freewheeling market been dislodged
from the public conception of a compensated regime.
In this article, we seek to outline a feasible compensated kidney-acquisition
system for the United States. We start in part II by delineating a set of
guidelines or principles that help to indicate desirable directions for reforms,
whether involving compensation or otherwise. Notions of what constitutes an
“appropriate donor” and an “appropriate environment” for kidney acquisition
are fundamental to these principles, and we adopt, at least loosely, a law-andeconomics efficiency-type standard. Following the identification of guidelines
for reform, we indicate a set of potential pitfalls that practical reform efforts
should aim to avoid, in part because they jeopardize the efficiency-enhancing
feature of increased transplants. In part III we narrow our focus to the decision
to donate a kidney, keeping in mind the possibility for less than fully rational
behavior on the part of potential donors—and the possibility that the
introduction of compensation will take advantage of shortsightedness or
otherwise compromise donor rationality. Furthermore, to sidestep notional
complications associated with the imprecise characterization of the current
system as “altruistic,” the paradigm we adopt is that of “donor as hero,” and we
argue from analogous activities such as military service that donor heroism is
not imperiled by either monetary or nonmonetary recompense. These
preliminaries offer instruction for designing a reform in ways that are likely to
increase the number of transplants in an efficiency-enhancing manner. For
instance, substitution possibilities among categories of donors make it fitting to

4. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, Tracking the Sale of a Kidney On a Path of Poverty and Hope, N. Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2004, at A1; Denis Campbell & Nicola Davison, Illegal Kidney Trade Booms as New
Organ Is ‘Sold Every Hour,’ THE GUARDIAN, May 27, 2012, at 1.
5. Jesse Schold et al., Half of Kidney Transplant Candidates Who Are Older than 60 Years Now
Placed on the Waiting List Will Die before Receiving a Deceased-Donor Transplant, 4 CLINICAL J. AM.
SOC. NEPHROLOGY 1239 (2009).
6. See generally, e.g., David C. Cronin II & Julio J. Elías, Operational Organization of a System
for Compensated Living Organ Providers, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR
COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS 34 (Sally Satel ed., 2008); Arthur J. Matas, Design of a Regulated
System of Compensation for Living Kidney Donors, 22 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 378 (2008).
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introduce compensation for living donors simultaneously with compensation for
deceased donors. Further, present bias and the value of an ongoing medical
relationship both suggest a back-loaded component to some elements of the
recompense provided to donors.
Our resulting proposal, presented in part IV, involves a public, nationwide,
monopsonistic kidney-procurement system. The system we recommend is based
on the current organ procurement–organization architecture, but introduces the
possibility for both deceased- and living-donor compensation. The main
evidence for the success of a reform would come in a significant increase in
transplants from suitable donors in a legal, medically sound, and respectful
environment.
II
PRINCIPLES AND PITFALLS
A. Efficiency and Related Considerations
Possessing a working kidney is extremely valuable; indeed, in the absence of
dialysis, it is a matter of life and death. Even with the possibility of sustentation
on dialysis, a transplant offers large improvements in the duration and quality
7
of life. At the same time, most people have excess capacity in kidney
functioning, such that the removal of one of their kidneys would not pose a
major risk for them. In the usual law-and-economics, Kaldor–Hicks sense, social
welfare is much improved when a kidney successfully travels (at low cost, at
least) from someone with two working kidneys to someone with no working
kidneys. Indeed, the overall social optimum probably involves every person
who has no functioning kidneys, and who is medically fit enough for a
transplant, receiving a transplant, from either an appropriate deceased or living
8
donor.
From this perspective, the chief problem with the current system is the
shortage of suitable kidneys for transplant. The goal of a policy reform,
therefore, is to lessen the shortage of suitable kidneys. A compensated system
can be a means to this end, but such a system surely is not an end in itself.
The existing kidney shortage involves both a stock and a flow component.
One measure of the stock component is the number of people on the waiting
list for a kidney. Changes in that number from year to year reflect the flow
component: An increase in the waiting list during the course of a year, for
7. A brief outline of the benefits of transplants as opposed to dialysis is available from the
National Kidney Registry. See Living Donors: Overview, NAT’L KIDNEY REGISTRY,
www.kidneyregistry.org/living_donors.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Living Donors:
Overview].
8. Potential exceptions to this claim might involve poor, uninsured patients whose low ability to
pay precludes them from having a high willingness to pay for a kidney. Transplants for these patients
would presumably still satisfy the Hicks criterion—if they had a transplant, the “losers” (presumably
the donors or the unpaid medical team) from the operations would not be willing to offer the recipients
enough money to induce the recipients to renounce their new kidney.
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instance, indicates that there were fewer transplants and other list removals (via
medical deterioration or death, for instance) over the course of the year than
there were new patients in need of a kidney. If the flow shortage can be
eliminated, the waiting list will stabilize or fall. Ending the flow shortage is
ultimately a necessary but not sufficient condition for ending the stock shortage.
9
However, we will focus our investigation on the flow component.
As noted, the shortage can be addressed not only by procuring more
kidneys, but also by other means of decreasing net additions to the waiting list.
Some of the methods of shortening the waiting list are far from socially
desirable. One method that does seem socially desirable, and that reforms
might want to promote, is to diminish medical conditions that tend to lead to
10
end-stage renal disease—conditions such as obesity and diabetes. The
recorded shortage also could be reduced if transplant centers were to show
more reluctance to place patients on the waiting list.
The suitability of a kidney for transplant is largely a medical issue, one that
depends on the health condition and tissue characteristics of both the recipient
and the donor. Of course, there might be trade-offs along the “quantity” and
“quality” dimensions: For example, a reform that increased the number of
kidney transplants might be desirable, even if the quality of the average
transplant were to decrease (by, say, a worsening of tissue matches, or longer
cold ischemic times, or the use of less fitting, “expanded criteria” donors). The
current pressing shortage encourages excessive economizing on quality to
promote quantity, by transplanting lower quality organs than would be
11
acceptable if kidneys were in ready supply. Likewise, the use of cadaveric
kidneys encourages transplanting those kidneys into near-at-hand recipients,
even if they are not the most medically appropriate patients, due to the
degrading of kidney function as time from explantation to transplantation rises.
The prospect for increased transplants to enhance overall efficiency requires
more than that the organs themselves be suitable. The donor must be
appropriate, along with the environment under which the donation and
transplant takes place. An appropriate (living) donor should be both physically
and psychologically fit, informed, uncoerced, and rational. The environment
must be designed to respect patients and their families, deliver high medical
quality, and offer protections for dealing with (unavoidable) bad outcomes,
mistakes, and so on. These conditions are necessary to make it likely that
9. Within the waiting list there are two subcategories, active and inactive. Patients who are
deemed to be inactive—perhaps because an acute condition has made them temporarily unfit for
transplants—are not eligible to receive deceased-donor kidneys when they become available. By 2011,
more than thirty percent of waiting-list candidates were inactive. M.E. Grams et al., Trends in the
Inactive Kidney Transplant Waitlist and Implications for Candidate Survival, 13 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 1012, 1012 (2013).
10. Again, the claim that this change would be efficiency enhancing can only be sustained if the
methods employed to achieve improved health are not themselves too costly.
11. T. RANDOLPH BEARD, DAVID L. KASERMAN & RIGMAR OSTERKAMP, THE GLOBAL
ORGAN SHORTAGE: ECONOMIC CAUSES, HUMAN CONSEQUENCES, POLICY RESPONSES 53–54
(2013).
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additional transplants really do increase efficiency, in both the Pareto and
Kaldor–Hicks senses. By contrast, the current black market generally fails to
insure that donors are appropriate and fails to deliver a healthy environment,
even when it succeeds in decreasing the kidney shortage. With these
considerations about “appropriateness” or “suitability” in mind, the first
principle for reform is that it should result in a reduction in the kidney shortage
by appropriate means, with appropriate donors, and with the transplants taking
place in an appropriate environment.
A second principle that helps to direct reforms in an efficiency-enhancing
direction is to make use of the strong features of the current system as much as
possible. One normative element of the current system worth preserving is
encouragement of the charitable impulse of donors, and the reciprocal
recognition of their generosity; donor sacrifice, whether compensated or
otherwise, should receive notice and approbation. The more functional
principle reflects the fact that implementation of a reform will typically be
easier the less it disrupts the current transplant regime. The status quo system,
despite ongoing kidney shortages, has garnered a good deal of acceptance: For
instance, the professionals working in the system, by and large, do not view the
12
system itself as hopelessly unethical. Further, the current system succeeds in
keeping the medical risks low for donors and for those patients who secure a
transplant.
A third principle, related to and perhaps even derivable from the first two, is
that the current default understanding—that a person is not a donor—should
continue to be respected. This principle helps to ensure that those who do
choose to become donors are suitable (in accordance with the first principle)
and is in keeping with the current system in the United States (in accordance
with the second principle). This principle is inconsistent with implied- or
presumed-consent systems, whereby people are considered to be on the register
for deceased donation in the absence of taking some proactive step to remove
themselves from the donor list. A system of presumed consent will sometimes
result in a transplant that conflicts with deeply held beliefs of the (deceased)
donor—though physicians generally will not harvest organs in the face of family
13
objection. Such transplants do not represent Pareto improvements, and
perhaps do not even enhance efficiency in a Kaldor–Hicks sense. It is possible,
of course, that even given these ill-advised transplants, a presumed-consent
system could stimulate so many additional transplants overall that it would be

12. See, e.g., Evangelos M. Mazaris et al., Attitudes Toward Live Donor Kidney Transplantation
and Its Commercialization, 25 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION E312 (2011); Evangelos M. Mazaris,
Anthony N. Warrens & Vassilios E. Papalois, Ethical Issues in Live Donor Kidney Transplant: Views of
Medical and Nursing Staff, 7 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 1 (2009).
13. Alberto Abadie and Sebastien Gay find that presumed consent does tend to increase cadaveric
donations by some twenty-five to thirty percent on average for the twenty-two countries in their
sample. Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation on Cadaveric
Organ Donation: A Cross Country Study 15 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10604,
2004).
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beneficial relative to the status quo. Relative to a system that can generate
those additional transplants without risking such serious mistakes, however,
presumed consent is less appealing. Further, even the potential benefit of
presumed consent in comparison with the status quo might be compromised by
widespread revulsion against transplanting a kidney from an unwilling deceased
donor.
B. Pitfalls
In designing reforms intended to accord with the above principles, there are
some foreseeable hazards that can be avoided. The first is the potential for the
benefit from a reform that increases one category of donations to be offset by
declines in the other categories. Potential donors can be divided into three
groups: cadaveric, living–directed, and living–undirected. It is possible, for
instance, that an increase in the availability of deceased-donor kidneys might
undermine the incentives for living donors to step forward. This “crowding out”
is not merely hypothetical. T. Randolph Beard, John D. Jackson, David
Kaserman, and Hyeongwoo Kim find that in the United States, where most
transplanted kidneys are sourced from deceased donors, about forty percent of
the increased supply associated with a small increase (one percent) in cadaveric
donations is offset, in the long run, by decreased living donations, and about
14
half of this offset takes place in the short run. The crowding out is substantial,
but far from complete. However, the significance of this offset is magnified by
the medical inferiority of transplants using cadaveric kidneys relative to
transplants involving living donors.
Beard, Jackson, Kaserman, and Kim, in an earlier version of the work cited
above, also investigate the opposite effect, whereby an increase in living
15
donations leads to fewer cadaveric donations. Though there are hints of some
incomplete crowding out, the statistical significance of this effect (using U.S.
data from 1992 through 2006) is marginal. Live donations do not pose the same
threat to cadaveric donations as cadaveric donations pose for live ones, at least
in the United States.
The evidence from the one nation that permits kidney vending, Iran, is also
suggestive, but not dispositive, with respect to live donors crowding out
cadaveric donations. Starting from a situation in the 1990s when there were no
transplants in Iran involving cadaveric kidneys, the number has climbed
16
steadily, to 914 in 2012. Cadaveric sources in 2012 accounted for more than
14. T. Randolph Beard et al., A Time-Series Analysis of the U.S. Kidney Transplantation and
Waiting List: Donor Substitution Effects, 42 EMPIRICAL ECON. 261, 273–75 (2012).
15. T. Randolph Beard et al., A Time-Series Analysis of U.S. Kidney Transplantation and Waiting
List: Donor Substitution Effects and “Dirty Altruism,” 15 (Auburn Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working
Paper No. 2010-01, 2010). For example, one possible mechanism here is that family members of a braindead person might be less likely to agree to organ harvesting, the more strongly they suspect that access
is available to live donations.
16. Database: Iran, INT’L REGISTRY ORGAN DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION,
http://www.irodat.org/?p=database&c=IR#data (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
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thirty-seven percent of Iranian kidney transplants. The monotonic growth in
cadaveric kidneys from 2000 to 2012 in Iran was accompanied by live donations
that were much steadier, moving between 1389 in the year 2000, to 1740 (the
17
maximum so far) in 2009, and to 1506 in 2012. Iran offers no prima facie
evidence, at least, that live donations crowd out cadaveric ones.
Within the category of live donors, an increase in compensated donations
might reduce the number of freely gifted kidneys. Nonetheless, many
uncompensated suppliers direct their donations to patients with whom they are
intimate: close relatives or friends. Some of these donations (those between
siblings, for instance) reduce the need for immunosuppresive drugs and thereby
improve health outcomes lead to better health outcomes through reduced need
for immunosuppressive drugs. This combination of inherently strong
motivations and improved medical outcomes could render the number of
unpaid directed donations rather stable in the face of increases in alternative
supplies through a compensated program. It is also possible that the donations
that would be crowded out by compensation are those where the full
18
commitment of the donors is most questionable. Nor is it necessary that the
introduction of compensation be restricted to undirected donors.
Increased kidney supplies might also prompt longer-term and differently
manifested crowding out: A reduced shortage of organs might spur behavioral
changes that lead fewer people to avoid the need for a kidney transplant. This
risk compensation could take the form of leading less healthy lifestyles,
19
inducing heightened risks for requiring a kidney in the future. Under these
circumstances, incentives to avoid behaviors that increase the probability of
needing a transplant surely are diminished. These same health-compromising
behaviors, incidentally, also are likely to make people less able to serve as
kidney donors, even if they themselves do not require a transplant. Reforms to
improve incentives to avoid health conditions necessitating transplants (and
simultaneously to maintain the suitability to become donors) might be desirable
independently of the precise mechanism for kidney procurement.
Another potential complication concerns evaluation of the effects of a
reform. Given that the current level of transplants is vastly suboptimal, one
meaningful success indicator would be an increase in the number of
transplants—perhaps even if the average medical outcome were to decline
slightly. What is less important as a measure of the desirability of a reform is the
20
effect on the waiting list for kidneys. Decisions to join the waiting list, and to
be removed, will be influenced by factors that reforms will alter, such as the
probability of receiving a transplant in a timely fashion. A reform that boosts

17. Id.
18. See Sally Satel, Concerns about Human Dignity and Commodification, in WHEN ALTRUISM
ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 6, at 63, 73–74 .
19. Imagine the extreme case, where transplants are so easy and available that people view endstage renal disease as a minor condition.
20. The waiting list might still be a good indicator of whether further reforms should be pursued.
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transplants and achieves good medical outcomes, therefore, could still engender
21
a lengthier waiting list.
A third potential pitfall, one that opponents of donor compensation often
highlight, is the possibility that a reform will stoke coerced or abusive
22
(essentially black market) trades. The desirability or undesirability of an
increased shadow market itself depends upon the appropriateness of the
donors, the quality of the donated organs, and the environment in which the
transplant takes place, and these features are highly questionable, judging from
23
exposés about the currently existing black markets. In Iran, where
compensated donations are legal and common, there are reports of
advertisements offering kidneys for sale in the vicinity of transplant centers—
though in the Iranian system, a kidney vendor is supposed to be matched to
someone on the waiting list through impersonal, regulated means, not through
24
direct connections. To the extent that transplants are arranged through these
informal means, however, the overall outcomes will be much affected by the
extent to which, once arranged, the transplants themselves take place within the
usual official structure. A more or less standard operation could ensue, for
instance, if the parties are able to convincingly masquerade as friends or
relatives hoping to arrange a gifted transplant, or if the official sector is coopted or corrupted to go along with obviously arranged sales. In this manner,
the medical outcomes might not be severely endangered, despite the illicit
means used to establish and fortify the donor–recipient connection.
For the black market to be spurred by a reform, presumably donors or
recipients or both would have to find the black market more advantageous
(than in the prereform setting) relative to the official system. Reforms involving
compensation that succeed in increasing the number of transplants from
suitable donors in a suitable environment would seem to leave little room, then,
21. William Harmon and Francis Delmonico make a similar point, though in the opposite
direction, arguing that the elimination of the waiting list through kidney vending in Iran “has as much
to do with limitations on listing candidates as it does with providing donors.” William Harmon &
Francis Delmonico, Payment for Kidneys: A Government-Regulated System Is Not Ethically Achievable,
1 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC. NEPHROLOGY 1146, 1146 (2006). The validity of such an effect presumably
requires that there be some mechanism whereby the introduction of vending increases limitations on
listings.
22. See, e.g., Gabriel M. Danovitch & Alan B. Leichtman, Kidney Vending: The “Trojan Horse” of
Organ Transplantation, 1 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1133 (2006); Ajay K. Isrania et al.,
Incentive Models to Increase Living Kidney Donation: Encouraging Without Coercing, 5 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 15 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Denis Campbell & Nicola Davison, Illegal Kidney Trade Booms as New Organ Is
‘Sold Every Hour,’ GUARDIAN, May 27, 2012, at 1; Paul Lewis, The Doctor at the Heart of Kosovo’s
Organ Scandal, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2010, at 30.
24. See Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Kidneys for Sale: Poor Iranians Compete to Sell Their Organs,
GUARDIAN, May 27, 2012, at 20. The blog Mostly Economics is what its name suggests, and is
maintained
by
an
economist
in
Bangalore.
My
Profile,
MOSTLY ECONOMICS,
http://mostlyeconomics.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). In 2008 this blog featured a
post on Iranian kidney compensation, and, unusually, it attracted more than ten comments—including
eight offers to sell kidneys. Regulated Market for Kidneys in Iran, MOSTLY ECONOMICS (Jul. 8, 2010,
4:20 PM), http://mostlyeconomics.wordpress.com/2010/07/08/regulated-market-for-kidneys-in-iran/.
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for growing the black market; if anything, both sides of the market should find
the regulated system more, not less, attractive than prior to reform. Arguments
suggesting that compensation will induce an expanded black market, therefore,
invoke supplementary considerations, perhaps involving some countries
deciding, in the face of reforms elsewhere, to tolerate a de facto unregulated
25
market. Such a market might then be attractive to clearly unsuitable donors
(who would be prevented from donating within a regulated system), and lower
prices might lead some patients on the waiting list to find the black market to be
a better option than it was prior to reform—but these are highly speculative
conjectures. Surely the standard effect of replacing a prohibition with a legal,
regulated alternative is commensurate with what happened following the repeal
of national alcohol prohibition in the United States: The black market contracts
significantly, though this result requires some continuing enforcement against
26
illicit trades.
A fourth potential pitfall of a compensated system is that payment might
magnify the rationality deficiencies of donors, with a consequent increase in
both inappropriate kidneys and inappropriate donors. The next part will look
more deeply at this problem, while examining some behavioral aspects of organ
donation.
III
RATIONALITY AND INFLUENCE IN THE DECISION TO DONATE
One of the major roles played by both property and contract law is to
smooth the path for assets to move, via voluntary exchanges, from low-valuing
owners to high-valuing owners. But in the case of human organs, the ban on
valuable consideration places a serious impediment to arranging these mutually
beneficial deals. The Kaldor–Hicks optimum cannot be achieved in practice,
because the payment prohibition means that the theoretical possibility of
sufficient compensation (that underlies the Kaldor–Hicks standard) cannot be
implemented. Without compensation, it is hard to make both donors and
recipients better off, even if deals would be quite beneficial overall. Though
recipients would realize large gains from transplants, and donors would suffer
(typically) only relatively small costs, the restricted forms of compensation
prove insufficient, in thousands of cases per year, to consummate these valuable
exchanges.

25. See, e.g., Vivekanand Jha & Kirpal S Chugh, The Case Against a Regulated System of Living
Kidney Sales, NATURE CLINICAL PRAC. NEPHROLOGY 466, 467 (2006) (“The acceptance of even a
limited domestic organ market in the advanced nations will act as the proverbial thin end of the wedge
and encourage adoption of commercial donation in the developing world.”).
26. Some states, counties, and localities remained “dry” following the end of national alcohol
prohibition in December 1933; further, the newly legal trade was subject to a host of regulations and
taxes. One surprising result was that the percentage of convicts entering prisons for liquor law
violations was more than twice as high in 1940 as in 1933. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850–1984 45
(1986).
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A main contribution of the behavioral turn in law and economics is that
trades that are voluntarily arranged among competent adults are no longer
presumed to be (ex ante) mutually advantageous simply because the trades
have been agreed to. Rather, people are considered to be imperfect stewards of
their own best interests, suffering from shortfalls in cognitive abilities,
27
rationality, and willpower. Applied to kidney transplants, a behavioral
perspective would interrogate the rationality of an individual’s decision to
28
donate (or, for that matter, to sell). The donation decision (including the
decision to register as a deceased donor) is particularly susceptible to
departures from full rationality because it is not one that an individual makes
on a recurring basis, with timely feedback received concerning the
29
consequences of previous decisions. The claims that kidney transplants (again,
with or without compensation) reflect Kaldor–Hicks improvements are only
sustainable if the revealed willingness-to-donate is a fairly accurate gauge of an
30
individual’s true, underlying preferences.
Behavioral economics illustrates that decisions—even quite important
ones—can be affected by framing and defaults and other details of the “choice
31
architecture.” Decisions, then, for good or ill, can be (or perhaps must be)
influenced by those who establish the architecture. Although such influence is
sometimes used for what have been deemed to be worthy purposes, as when
people must “opt out” rather than “opt in” to retirement plans that are highly
beneficial to them, the manipulation might not always be so benign (or so
conscious). In the case of kidney transplants, the system involves opportunities
for manipulation of potential donors, and those opportunities exist whether or
not “valuable consideration” is an element of the system. With or without
monetary awards, the exploitation of behavioral patterns that are less than fully
rational undermines the efficiency-based (let alone the ethical) case for
donation, and, to the extent possible, should be avoided. Having the default
condition be that no one is a donor unless a proactive step is taken (which we
endorse in part II) is one way to lessen the possibility that the default setting
27. See Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 657,
658 (2002) (discussing meaningful and systematic departures from full rationality); Richard H. Thaler &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavioral Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
(David R. Henderson ed. 2008) (explaining how behavioral economics differs from traditional
economics by acknowledging the limits of the human characteristics assumed by traditional economics,
including “unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower, and unbounded selfishness”).
28. The wide applicability of behavioral-economics reasoning extends to the decisions of every
actor connected with kidney transplants: donors and recipients, their family members, organprocurement specialists, physicians and other medical personnel, insurers, and even people who one
day might become kidney donors or recipients. Nonetheless, we will restrict our attention to donors.
29. On the importance of feedback in improving decision making, see Richard H. Thaler, Cass R.
Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY
428 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
30. Of course, behavioral-economics insights concerning the endowment effect and framing, for
instance, call into question the existence of some sort of underlying “true” willingness to donate or
preferences more generally.
31. See Thaler et al., supra note 29.
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might result in undesired donations.
A. Deceased Donors
The ongoing shortages in transplantable kidneys have sparked intense
interest in encouraging more individuals to agree to make their organs available
for posthumous transplant. Presumptive eligibility for deceased donation of
organs typically is extended to individuals who are on the donor registry. How
and whether an individual ends up on the donor registry, therefore, become
matters of paramount importance with respect to the number of cadaveric
organs that will be available for transplant. Registry default rules, in particular,
have come under scrutiny, especially given the behavioral-economics finding of
the surprising hardiness of default settings, even when defaults can be altered
32
with little effort.
Most countries, including the United States, set up an opt-in system, one in
which the default is that a person is not a donor. One might suspect that given
the inertia accompanying default settings, an opt-in system leads many people
33
who would like to be on the registry to, nevertheless, fail to sign up. Successful,
inexpensive inducements to join the registry, then, as long as they are not so
bedazzling as to tempt committed nondonors to register, will contribute to
34
enhanced efficiency. A first step is to ease the process of joining. In the United
States, one common mechanism is that people can register as donors at the
same time that they receive or renew their driver’s licenses. Driver’s license sign
up and, more recently, social media efforts to facilitate registering as an organ
donor have been important in increasing the number of designated donors in
35
recent years.
Some jurisdictions have selected a different donor-default setting. In “optout” or presumed-consent countries, people are presumed to be willing to serve
as organ donors in the event of their death—but they can choose to remove
themselves from the registry. That is, in opt-out jurisdictions, the default
condition is that you are an organ donor, whereas in opt-in jurisdictions like the
United States, you only join the registry if you explicitly choose to do so.
Nations such as Spain and Austria that have switched from opt-in to opt-out
36
approaches have seen large increases in the number of registered donors.
32. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 159–82 (2008).
33. See PETER JOHN ET AL., NUDGE, NUDGE, THINK, THINK: EXPERIMENTING WITH WAYS TO
CHANGE CIVIC BEHAVIOR 97, 100 (2011) (suggesting that preferences to be a donor as revealed by
mandated choices without defaults are more common than is registration itself in the United States).
34. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services maintains a website with information on
joining the donor registry. Becoming a Donor, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/
becomingdonor/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
35. A. M. Cameron et al., Social Media and Organ Donor Registration: The Facebook Effect, 13
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2059, 2060–61 (2013).
36. Amber Rithalia, et al., Impact of Presumed Consent for Organ Donation on Donation Rates: A
Systematic Review, 338 BMJ 1, 7 (2009) (indicating that before and after studies show significant
increases in donor registrations when moving from an opt-in to an opt-out default, though default rules
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However, the durability of default options suggests that some people who have
no interest in donating, or who even have an aversion to donating, nevertheless
remain on the donor list under a presumed-consent system. In Austria, less than
37
one percent of the population opts out of the donor registry.
A middle ground between opt in and opt out crafts the default as the
necessity to make an explicit choice—perhaps as a requirement (or near
38
requirement) for receiving a driver’s license. Under this system, license
39
applicants are asked if they want to register as an organ donor: yes or no. The
answer that they give will then determine their status. In this way, no one is
added to the organ-donor list simply from a failure to make an explicit choice.
This “forced choice” alternative would seem to do a pretty good job of keeping
off the registry those who have fairly strong reservations concerning donation—
though some individuals might not appreciate being regularly asked to consider
the fate of their organs following their demise.
Marketing can be used to increase organ-donor registrations independently
of the default setting, though it plays a more central role in opt-in jurisdictions.
Given the exclusive reliance on benevolence (under current U.S. circumstances)
as the motivating device for registering as an organ donor, there is an effort to
highlight to others the value of the charitable act. “Donate the gift of life” is the
exhortation employed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
40
in its information for potential organ donors. The significant influence of peer
groups also has been applied to the cause of promoting organ donation.
Facebook makes it easy for its users to share their organ-donor status with
others, and also provides links to the appropriate websites for those who decide
41
they want to register. Some states saw an immediate jump in registered donors
42
following Facebook’s implementation of its donor facility.
More tangible inducements also can be used to encourage registration as an
organ donor. One possibility that has been adopted in Israel and elsewhere is to
provide registered donors (of three years or more standing) with priority for
themselves cannot explain the variation between countries with respect to donation rates.)
37. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 29, at 417, 418 fig.24.2.
38. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 180.
39. In large parts of the United Kingdom, the license-application question is not of the yes-or-no
variety. Instead, applicants asked if they would like to join the organ-donor registry can indicate that
they are already registered, or can choose either “yes” or “not yet”; that is, there is no explicit choice of
“no” available. See Peter Walker, Driving Licence Applicants Asked to Join Organ Donor Register,
GUARDIAN, Jul. 31, 2011, at 13.
40. ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/becomingdonor/index.html (last visited Feb.
6, 2014).
41. Share
Your
Organ
Donor
Status,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/416967021677693/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). On peer effects in
behavioral economics, see, for example, John Beshears et al., The Effect of Providing Peer Information
on Retirement Savings Decisions (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17345, 2011).
42. Russell Goldman, States See Instant Spike in Organ Donors Following Facebook Push, ABC
NEWS (May 2, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/states-instant-spike-organ-donors-facebookpush/story?id=16255979.
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receipt of an organ should they find themselves in need. Singapore combines a
similar priority program with an opt-out system: People in Singapore who
choose to opt out of the organ-donor registry will receive lower priority should
43
they need a transplant.
B. Living Donors
All else equal, the receipt of a kidney from a living donor offers better
medical outcomes than receipt from a deceased donor. The brief time window
during which to transplant a viable kidney from a deceased donor complicates
the process of ensuring match quality; further, the kidney shortage incentivizes
an expansive approach to what cadaveric kidneys qualify for transplant.
Nonetheless, about two-thirds of kidney transplants in the United States involve
44
deceased donors.
Any system that permits living kidney donation, whether compensated or
not, must be predicated on a view of human decision making such that, in at
least some plausible cases, adults may be left unmolested in their choices, even
when those choices are irreversible and have meaningful consequences. In the
case of living kidney donation, significant evidence suggests quite low medical
45
risks to the donor. Nonetheless, these low risks are surely not negligible—a
nephrectomy that carried literally no medical risk would attract more
volunteers than do the low-risk procedures currently available. It is likely that
much of the concern about kidney donation, however, is not directly tied to
medical risks. Sources of unease include the potential for regret (because the
decision cannot be taken back, and perhaps a son or daughter later will need a
kidney), loss of economic opportunities (for example, the inability to play
certain sports, enlist in some military units, or obtain insurance), and social risks
arising from the unique relationship created between a donor and his or her
46
recipient.
A system that does a good job of facilitating efficient kidney transplants
must also make sufficient numbers of living donors willing to step forward,
despite the medical and other risks, in order to ensure overall welfare
47
improvement. The obvious methods to encourage living donation are to
43. On the organ-procurement system in Singapore, see Al Roth, Organ Donation and
Compensation in Singapore: New Legislation, MARKET DESIGN (Mar. 29, 2009, 5:34 AM),
http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2009/03/organ-donation-and-compensation-in.html.
44. According to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, deceased donors
accounted for 66.1% of US kidney transplants in 2013. Transplants by Donor Type, HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp? (select
“Transplant” and “Kidney” then “Transplants by Donor Type”) (last visited July 25, 2014).
45. See generally Arthur J. Matas, Risks of Kidney Transplantation to a Living Donor, in WHEN
ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 6, at 10, 12–
18 (examining the short-term and long-term medical risks to a living kidney donor).
46. See, e.g., Allison Tong et al., Public Attitudes and Beliefs About Living Kidney Donation: Focus
Group Study, 97 TRANSPLANTATION 977, 979–81 (2014) (indicating categories of concerns expressed
by the general public in Australia about living kidney donation.)
47. Of course, the numbers that will prove sufficient depend on the demand and on the availability
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reduce risks and to compensate for the hazards that remain. Risk mitigation can
be served by careful donor screening, selection, and ongoing case management;
indeed, systems for doing this already are well established.
Do potential live donors respond “rationally” to the medical risks?
Behavioral economics suggests that people often struggle to make sound
decisions in choice situations connected to low probability events. Some risks
tend to be ignored entirely, although others—particularly if they involve a vivid
and readily available image of disaster, such as harms from acts of terrorism—
can greatly be exaggerated. Knowledge of a friend who happened to suffer a
relatively low-probability harm, for instance, can do much to enhance
perceptions of that specific risk. Physicians are duty bound, of course, to make
the risks of a nephrectomy well understood (though not to exaggerate them or
to intensify their salience). Nonetheless, the medical harms that must be
considered are literally and figuratively visceral, making it not unlikely that
these harms will tend to figure disproportionately in a potential donor’s
48
decision calculus.
Even when probabilities are well understood, people generally exhibit loss
aversion: They are quite concerned about a negative change from the status quo
(or perhaps some other salient reference point). Surely the possibility of
negative outcomes, whether minor inconvenience or, at the extreme, donor
49
death (which happens in about three in ten thousand nephrectomies), looms
large in donor decision making—and this specter can hardly be adjudged to
represent irrationality or a mistake, even if it is exaggerated in the minds of
50
some potential donors. The endowment effect, which refers to our tendency to
raise our subjective value of assets that we already own, also might be
51
particularly applicable to body parts.
One other factor that might influence the rationality of donor decision
making is the common propensity towards excessive concern with the present
relative to the future. Given that many of the medical (and other) “costs” of
kidney donation are immediate while most of the benefits (say, in terms of
satisfaction) occur in the future, donation is a decision that present-biased
of cadaveric organs.
48. The iconic behavioral-economics model for choice under uncertainty, prospect theory,
typically involves a probability-weighting function that excessively weights low-probability risks. See
Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 173, 177.
49. Dorry L. Segev et al., Perioperative Mortality and Long-Term Survival Following Live Kidney
Donation, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 959, 959 (2010).
50. The subjective-wellbeing literature might suggest that people will adapt to (nonfatal) medical
conditions that result from donation, so that those problems, in the long run, will not compromise
donor happiness. At the same time, people who have serious medical conditions (that presumably they
have adapted to) are often willing to pay very significant amounts to overcome their conditions. See
George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and Experience
Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795, 1799 (2008) (“[P]eople with disabilities have a strong
desire to be healthy, even if they experience normal levels of happiness.”).
51. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 278–99 (2011) (discussing loss
aversion and the endowment effect).
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52

people are likely to postpone.
All told, just considering the medical risks, one standard set of behavioraleconomics departures from rationality—risk misperceptions, loss aversion, the
endowment effect, and present bias—is likely to, on average, lend a “no
donation” bias to individual decision making. If transplants involving
inappropriate donors are especially to be avoided, however—as we have
argued—then this bias is acceptable.
Medical risks to the donor are not the only “cost” facing living donors. One
outcome that might be much more relevant for a living as opposed to a
cadaveric donor is that the transplant might fail for the recipient. Particularly if
the recipient is a relative or close friend, it would be understandable if a
transplant involving recipient death or graft rejection were to be a source of
significant unhappiness and regret on the part of the donor. Fortunately, recent
studies have not found increased regret or emotional harm to donors connected
to unsuccessful transplants; perhaps this result speaks to a realistic
53
pretransplant understanding of the risks of failure.
Consider also the social risk connected to the special relationship that a live
kidney transplant creates between the donor and the recipient. Might a donor
later approach a recipient asking for money or other support? Might a recipient
form an unhealthy attachment to the donor or donor’s family? The emotional
ties created by donation—especially (but not exclusively) living donation—are
fertile ground for the emergence of entanglements inconsistent with the welfare
54
and dignity of the participants. One way to mitigate this social risk is to prefer
55
those donors who already are embedded in social networks with the recipients.
For undirected donations, the obvious and usual recommendation to avoid
56
untoward donor–recipient encounters is anonymity. If donors and recipients
do not know one another, and do not meet, the chances for adverse contacts are
very low. Maintaining anonymity can be challenging with living donation, where
the donor and recipient might be in the same hospital, even on the same floor,
with family wandering about. Nonetheless, anonymity, if desired, can generally
52. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 104
(1999).
53. See, e.g., Márcia Fátima Faraldo Martinez Garcia et al., Living Kidney Donors—A Prospective
Study of Quality of Life Before and After Kidney Donation, 27 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 9, 11–12
(2013); Marta B. Padrão & Yvoty A. S. Sens, Quality of Life of Living Kidney Donors in Brazil: An
Evaluation by the Short Term Form-36 and the WHOQOL-bref Questionnaires, 23 CLINICAL
TRANSPLANTATION 621, 621 (2009). But see Eric M. Johnson et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Living
Kidney Donors: Quality of Life After Donation, 67 TRANSPLANTATION 717, 717 (1999) (finding that
those donors whose recipients died were less likely to indicate that given the opportunity, they would
donate again).
54. Of course, the special donor–recipient relationship can be a source of great joy and
contentment, too.
55. But see the discussion of family members of directed donors in part IV.
56. But see C. Bradley Wallis et al., Kidney Paired Donation, 26 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS
TRANSPLANTATION 2091, 2097 (2011) (reporting that of twenty-five pairs offered the choice of
anonymity in a paired-donation setting, twenty-four pairs chose to meet, and evaluated the meetings as
a positive experience).
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survive these logistical challenges.
Some of the costs facing live donors can be compensated for under current
U.S. law. Medical costs, including preoperative screening and post-op recovery,
are eligible for recompense, typically by the recipient’s public or private health
insurance. Other donor expenses, such as travel, hotel costs, and subsistence,
can also legally be paid for the donor, though health insurers generally do not
cover these expenses. The National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC)
offers compensation for such expenses when coverage is not otherwise available
57
(including from the kidney recipient’s own resources).
NLDAC
reimbursement, which is available both to a directed donor and to one or two
support persons, can be as much as $6000. Lost wages also are legally eligible
for recompense, though these are not typically compensated through insurance
58
or by the NLDAC.
As the founding of the NLDAC suggests, compensation is widely
understood to be meaningful; some otherwise-willing donors cannot afford to
bear the costs associated with donation. The U.S. federal government and some
states have passed laws that guarantee paid leave for their employees who
donate kidneys—thereby ensuring that lost wages are accounted for, while also
making available the time required for a nephrectomy and recovery. A handful
of states have legislated unpaid-leave policies that apply to the organ donations
of employees of private businesses, although others provide tax deductions or
59
tax credits to donors.
In addition to solutions that address compensating the direct costs of
donation, strategies are available whereby the loss of future economic
opportunities can be mitigated from the outset. First, the problem might be
avoided by disclosure: A precise list of the opportunities foregone by donation
can be presented to individuals considering donation. Those donors who are
most subject to economic losses can choose not to donate (if those losses are
not eligible for compensation). Further, narrowing broad donor criteria can
reduce such problems. For example, by restricting donors to a minimum age of
twenty-five or thirty, loss of the opportunity to enlist in the military would

57. NAT’L LIVING DONOR ASSISTANCE CENTER, http://www.livingdonorassistance.org (last
visited Feb. 6, 2014).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) permits reasonable recompense for “the
expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with
the donation of the organ.” Lost wages typically are not paid by insurers or recipients, though federal
employees who donate organs are eligible for thirty days of paid leave (5 U.S.C. § 6327 1999). S.
Klarenbach et al., Economic Consequences Incurred by Living Kidney Donors: A Canadian MultiCenter Prospective Study, 14 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 916, 918 (2014) find that a sample of Canadian
kidney donors had an average economic detriment associated with their donation of $3268.
59. NATIONAL KIDNEY FOUNDATION, DONOR LEAVE LAWS AND TAX DEDUCTIONS/CREDITS
FOR LIVING DONORS (2013), available at http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/livingdonors/pdf/
LDTaxDed_Leave.pdf. The early evidence is that the existing tax policies (which generally involve
relatively low amounts of compensation) do not do much to spur donation. A.S. Venkataramani et al.,
The Impact of Tax Policies on Living Organ Donations in the United States, 12 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2133, 2133 (2012).
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rarely matter, because few people choose to enlist at these (or higher) ages.
Bans on monetary compensation (beyond the limited coverage of costs)
place a premium on nonmonetary methods of recruiting live organ donors,
paralleling the encouragement of registering as a deceased donor. Most live
donations come from close friends or relatives, whose primary motivations are
humane. Mechanisms are put in place to try to detect and eliminate coerced
donations, although intrafamily pressure, whether subtle or overt, can be strong
60
and persistent. The present system seems to recognize that even donations
motivated chiefly by magnanimity are more likely to occur when financial
burdens on donors are eased.
One in-kind form of compensation that is permitted is for donors to be
given priority on the waiting list for an organ, should the medical need later
arise: Live donors in the United States are awarded “points” that improve their
61
standing for a future claim on a kidney. Efforts by physicians and hospitals to
reduce the burden of a nephrectomy, such as by operating laparoscopically,
could also be considered as inducements, though perhaps not of the “valuable
62
consideration” variety.
Attempts to highlight the charitable nature of a live donation also are
employed to induce more such gifts—much as they are used to spur joining
deceased–organ donor lists. The National Kidney Foundation’s online store
63
offers a “Living Donor Split Pin.” The idea is that the pin comes in two halves,
one half (“I gave the gift of life”) to be worn by a donor, the other (“I received
the gift of life”) by a recipient. Local news outlets often report quite
64
approvingly on the personal tales of donors as well as organ recipients.
The chains, and conceivably quite long chains, of transplants that mark
kidney paired–donation schemes also hold the potential to enhance the
benevolent element in donation. A single undirected kidney donation (a

60. One mechanism is a type of signal jamming, where a reluctant relative will be ruled out as a
donor, but whether the ruling is for medical reasons or other reasons will not be revealed to the
recipient. One concern with kidney paired–donation schemes is that the opportunity that not being a
medical match offers to someone gracefully to bow out of an undesired donation becomes less viable.
61. Living Donors: Overview, supra note 7.
62. Laparoscopic nephrectomies utilize much smaller incisions and are associated with shorter
recovery times.
63. Gifts, NKF STORE, http://nkf.worksmartsuite.com/UserContentStart.aspx?category=47 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2014) (follow “Living Donor Split Pin” hyperlink).
64. See, e.g., Melanie Scott Dorsey, Michigan Man Honored for Donating Kidney to 10-Year-Old
Stranger,
BATTLE
CREEK
ENQUIRER
(Feb.
21,
2013,
12:51
PM),
http://www.battlecreekenquirer.com/article/20130221/NEWS/302210017/Michigan-man-honoreddonating-kidney-10-year-old-stranger. Another news report two days later illustrates some of the
complexities of the ban on valuable consideration. The Michigan donor developed medical
complications in the wake of his nephrectomy; he is a business owner, and his business was suffering.
Fundraisers, both live and online, were held to ease his financial worries. Many of those contributing to
the fundraisers were motivated by his kidney donation. Joshua Rosener, Community Support Helps
Brian Martindale, Kidney Donor for 10-Year-Old Jessica Schwerin, Move Beyond Financial Woes,
MLIVE (Feb. 23, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/bay-city/index.ssf/2013/02/community_
support_helps_brian.html.
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donation to the waiting list) might catalyze dozens of subsequent transplants,
surely enhancing warm-glow payoffs. But paired-donation schemes, at least in
some incarnations, also involve donors not knowing (in advance) their
recipients—a feature that, if required, could undermine philanthropic
donations.
Local journalistic outlets not only report on successful transplants but also
carry stories of people desperately seeking kidneys: The plight of those in need
of a transplant is a newsworthy item. Family members or the patients
themselves sometimes publicize their situations, including on the internet and
occasionally on billboards. Indeed, moving stories of patients seeking kidneys
abound on social-networking sites. Find a Kidney Central was started on
Facebook following a successful Facebook effort on behalf of a single identified
patient: He received a kidney from a stranger, despite having a blood type that
65
is hard to match. Find a Kidney Central now lists more than 350 people
66
seeking a kidney.
The Living Kidney Donors Network provides information to patients in
need of a kidney on how to recruit donors. According to its homepage, “The
Living Kidney Donors Network is a not-for-profit organization whose primary
[m]ission is to educate people who need a kidney transplant about the living
donation process and to prepare them to effectively communicate their need to
67
family members and friends.” The network recommends that patients set up
websites and Facebook pages publicizing their need for kidneys, as well as
taking other steps to spread the word.
More institutionalized marketing of live organ donation also takes place.
For instance, the World Transplant Games Federation sponsors athletic events
68
involving transplant recipients, in part to encourage donation. In the United
States, Valentine’s Day is National Donor Day, and April is National Donate
69
Life Month. April 19 is Blue and Green Day, which encourages people to
dress in the colors of blue and green to signal their support for organ, eye, and
70
tissue donation. As with the World Transplant Games, these events are aimed
at encouraging both living donation and registration for deceased donation.
The altruistic focus of marketing efforts on behalf of living kidney donation,
as well as adulatory press coverage of donors, holds the potential for a perverse

65. Shakthi Jothianandan, Leah Hostalet Helps Find Kidney Transplant Matches on Facebook,
PEOPLE (Feb. 14, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20673541,00.html.
66. Find a Kidney Central, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/FindAKidneyCentral and
https://www.facebook.com/notes/find-a-kidney-central/a-list-of-those-in-need-of-a-kidney-on-thispage/166662046784598 (last visited Jun. 20, 2014).
67. LIVING KIDNEY DONORS NETWORK, http://www.lkdn.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
68. WORLD TRANSPLANT GAMES FED’N, http://www.wtgf.org/default.asp (last visited Feb. 2,
2014).
69. National Events, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/materialsresources/
materialsntlevents.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
70. National Blue & Green Day 2013, DONATE LIFE, http://donatelife.net/bluegreen2013/ (last
visited Feb. 6, 2014).
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effect: Kidney donation might be viewed as much more of a sacrifice than it
71
really is. This is perhaps especially likely as the risks of donation fall with
experience and medical advances. Perhaps treating kidney donation more like
other forms of charitable behavior, or treating kidney donors like familiarly
heroic firefighters, police, and military personnel—and not in a special class of
otherworldly self-sacrifice—would yield a more objective understanding of the
risks and encourage more donation.
The methods of persuasion aimed at prospective donors in the current
system do not produce nearly enough donors. These same methods, however,
have the virtue that they are unlikely to produce many inappropriate donors.
The main exception to that conclusion is a (presumably small) subset of
directed donations by intimates of the recipient, who might be subjected to
family pressure that is hard to resist, and hard for outsiders to detect.
C. Monetary Compensation and the Decision to Donate
What if the ban on “valuable consideration” were to be lifted? How would
the new opportunity to pay donors influence the number of donors and the
rationality of decisions to donate?
It might be argued that any type of compensation would automatically
render the donors inappropriate, perhaps through coercion, or by encouraging
misrepresentations of medical conditions on the part of desperate would-be
kidney sellers, or of the medical risks by unscrupulous would-be recipients or
72
health professionals. Note that most arguments against compensation do not
start and stop by claiming that compensation is unethical. Rather, the ethical
concerns are complemented by arguments concerning consequences, such as
73
the possibility of donors feeling coerced. Our efficiency perspective is, as
usual, consequences-based; hence, we will continue under the assumption that
compensation per se is not ruled out by ethics (and of course, despite the ban,
some forms of compensation, including lost wages and priority on the organ
waiting list and tax deductions, exist in the current system). For those who do
object to compensation (or simply to monetary compensation) on ethical, not
consequential, grounds, our approach can be viewed as examining what sort of
kidney-procurement system would be appropriate if their ethical view did not
prevail in the legislative arena.
Decisions to donate an organ are complex. Every decision, whether as
simple as selecting lunch or as complex as considering kidney explantation, is
the net or end product of numerous motivations, only one of which is the pure
commercial motivation associated with an economistic worldview. In mundane
transactions, frequently the monetary motive is primary, so other motives (for
71. Alexander Berger, Op-Ed., Why Selling Kidneys Should Be Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011.
72. Alternatively, these concerns might be directed exclusively at monetary payments to live
donors, and not at other types of compensation.
73. See A.L. Caplan et al., Financial Compensation for Cadaver Organ Donation: Good Idea or
Anathema, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2740, 2740–41 (1993).
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example, “Do I think the seller is a good person?” or “Is this purchase
ethical?”) are largely or completely ignored. In transactions in which broader
motivations are implicated, standard economic intuitions might be overturned;
for example, the introduction of monetary compensation to what had previously
been a nonmonetary setting could reduce overall incentives to engage in the
74
rewarded behavior.
For many or most people, kidney donation, even when compensated, will
involve substantial nonmonetary motives. The (often rightful) neglect of
nonmonetary motives in mundane transactions will not be appropriate for
compensated kidney donations. Any reasonable compensated system, including
(we hope) our proposal, will therefore not entail a standard market involving
the straightforward buying and selling of kidneys.
Note that any additional consideration provided to kidney donors, beyond
the currently compensable costs, need not take the form of explicit monetary
payments. Incremental inducements might be especially attractive if they
remain within the health-care arena. In the mental accounting of donors and
others, health-related benefits can be coded as a species of reciprocity, and
hence widely perceived as fair, rather than as payment for transfer of asset
75
ownership. For instance, the provision of subsidized or free health insurance or
enhanced health coverage, either for a specified time or for a lifetime, could be
a substantial inducement to donation.
In-kind transfers can be quite valuable, perhaps valuable enough to induce
76
sufficient donations to end kidney shortages by themselves. What happens if
these transfers are supplemented by meaningful monetary compensation? It is
possible (even likely) that cash benefits might be subject to a higher degree of
present bias than noncash benefits; indeed, many of the benefits of improved
access to health insurance, for instance, occur in the distant future. If the
prospect of quick cash leads people into imprudent or desperate decisions, then
our confidence in the efficiency-enhancing properties of increased transplants
will be undermined. One way to combat this present bias would be to back-load
much of the monetary recompense. To some extent, a time delay is built in by
the necessity for medical and psychological screening. Typically, many weeks
would pass between the moment that a potential donor presents to an organ77
procurement agency and the time the transplant takes place. The delay could

74. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–16 (2000).
75. See generally Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159.
76. See Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, The Currency of Reciprocity
20 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 377, 2010) (finding that an
unexpected in-kind bonus is more successful at spurring worker productivity than an equally valuable
unexpected monetary bonus).
77. In the UK, for instance, donor assessment takes at least three months. Living Kidney
HEALTH
SERVICE,
Donation-Questions
&
Answers,
NATIONAL
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/how_to_become_a_donor/living_kidney_donation/questions_and_an
swers.asp (last visited Jun. 24, 2014).
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purposely be enhanced to help screen out those desperate for cash;
furthermore, a large fraction of the recompense could be given in installments
over future years. This approach also has the benefit of helping to keep donors
in contact with the transplant system, and hence available for follow-up care
and evaluation.
The concern that donors and recipients could be placed in an uncomfortable
relationship might be heightened when monetary compensation enters the
picture. Among other problems, the entire scheme might be called into question
in the wake of a publicized inappropriate interaction: Perhaps a demand by the
donor or her family for additional funds or an unlikely demand by the recipient
for a share in the monetary proceeds. Current guidelines concerning
communication between recipients and deceased-donor families or living,
undirected donors are quite complex, though mutually agreed upon face-to-face
78
and written communication is feasible. These guidelines, recently evolved to
include undirected living donors, might need reexamination following the
introduction of compensation.
Donor families are sometimes viewed as obstructionist by transplant
surgeons and others closely tied to the transplant system. In the case of
deceased donors, physicians are extremely reluctant to honor premortem
statements of intent to donate if a family member objects. Because families
have many members, someone often objects. The result in the United States is a
79
yield rate of around fifty percent of potential standard-criteria donors.
Compensation can provide family members with an additional reason not to
object. Honoring a cadaveric donation with recognition and funeral assistance
are obvious and humane methods to provide such a reason.
Finally, the inclusion of a financial dimension to the donation decision is, for
80
many people, repugnant. Such repugnance, attached to the “sale” of body
parts, sometimes is sufficiently strong as to constitute a constraint on market
exchange. Repugnance can evolve or dissolve over time, however, and the
erosion of repugnance already has taken place for market trade in many body
81
parts, including hair, sperm, eggs, plasma, and breast milk. Further, there is
already substantial public support for some forms of compensation for organ
donors.
Although repugnance need not foreclose a compensated system for kidney
donation, it does suggest that the design of such a system avoid offending
sensibilities. The sorts of protections that help to ensure that donor choices are
informed and rational, however, generally are those that, by moving donation
78. National
Communication
Guidelines,
NAT’L
KIDNEY
FOUND.
(2004),
http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/donorFamilies/infoPolicyGuidelines.cfm.
79. A. Andrés et al., Lower Rate of Family Refusal for Organ Donation in Non-Heart-Beating
Versus Brain-Dead Donors, 41 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2304, 2305 (2009).
80. See Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2007, at
37.
81. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT
WE OWN 238–56 (2011) (Owning Life).
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far away from a “typical” market, also tend to lower the “disgust” factor.
Elements of our proposed system (laid out in part IV), such as a marketing-free,
monopsonistic procurement agency, back-loaded monetary compensation, and
the continued recognition that donors are engaged in a praiseworthy act—the
“donor as hero” paradigm—are examples of reforms that simultaneously help
to ensure that those transplants that do take place are welfare enhancing, and
help to minimize the market elements that might be most likely to stoke
82
repugnance. Regulations that will steer donation decisions in a direction that
minimizes the potential for rationality shortfalls, and hence offer support for
the usual presumption that informed adults are best placed to make choices that
serve their interests, will lessen the sway of repugnance.
D. Heroes and Compensation
Donor-compensation packages should be constructed in a manner
consistent with social recognition of praiseworthy behavior. The act of
providing a kidney to another person, and thereby saving that person from
profound disability or death, is heroic.
Our use of the term “heroic” to describe donors is purposeful, not
haphazard; our intention is to offer a reorientation from the common (but
83
imprecise) description of kidney donation as “altruistic.” Altruism involves
84
taking an action for the benefit of another without regard for reward.
Heroism, alternatively, supplements altruism with an additional feature: the
85
presence of a “risk of potential harm.” An anonymous contribution to charity
may well be altruistic, but generally it would not be considered to be heroic. A
civilian who rushes into a burning building to save a stranger is acting not just
86
altruistically, but also heroically.
Live kidney donors surely behave in a manner that helps others, while also
facing risks of serious harms. In the United States, for every 100,000 kidney
explantations, approximately thirty-one donors would be expected to perish,
82. Indeed, it might be the suspicion that money leads to diminished rationality that lies beneath
some of the aversion to compensated organ donations.
83. Even critics of the current system often refer to it as one based on altruism. See, e.g., Sally
Satel, Introduction to WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY
DONORS, supra note 6, at 1, 3–4 (Sally Satel ed., 2008); Cody Corley, Money as a Motivator: The Cure to
Our Nation’s Organ Shortage, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93 (2011).
84. See
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
ONLINE,
available
at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/5857?redirectedFrom=altruism#eid (3d ed. 2012) (defining “altruism”
first as “disinterested or selfless concern for the well-being of others, esp. as a principle of action.”).
85. Douglas M. Stenstrom & Mathew Curtis, Heroism and Risk of Harm, 3 Psychology 1085, 1085
(2012). See also Selwyn W. Becker & Alice H. Eagly, The Heroism of Women and Men, 59 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 163, 164 (2004) (distinguishing heroism from altruistic behavior by noting that some
element of risk is involved in heroic acts); Eranda Jayawickreme & Paul Di Stefano, How Can We
Study Heroism? Integrating Persons, Situations and Communities, 33 POL. PSYCHOL. 165, 167 (2012)
(including personal risk as one of the defining characteristics of heroism).
86. The citizen fire rescuer is the paradigmatic example of a civil hero. Zeno E. Franco, Kathy
Blau & Philip G. Zimbardo, Heroism: A Conceptual Analysis and Differentiation Between Heroic
Action and Altruism, 15 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 99, 105 (2011).
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87

and medical and social complications are even more likely. Donor behavior,
88
therefore, is more aptly characterized as “heroic” than as “altruistic.”
The prevailing use of the term “altruistic” to describe kidney donors is not
only imprecise, but it also sets up a sort of casuistic barrier to considerations of
compensated donations. If altruism is the exclusive motivation for donating a
kidney in a system that does not provide donor compensation, then existing
would-be donors could easily be dissuaded by the introduction of even the
option of compensation. Although compensation would recruit some new
donors, the fact that they were unwilling to donate “altruistically” propounds
that the newcomers’ sole motivation is monetary. That is, the description of
current donations as altruistic suggests that compensation leads to substantial or
complete crowding out of existing donors, as well as to the recruitment of new,
money-motivated sellers.
But current donors are not “mere” altruists; they are taking on risks, they
are heroes. Altruism is one element of a donor’s behavior, but the donation
transcends altruism. The sacrifice of donors is similar to that of police officers,
firefighters, and soldiers: all of these people engage in risky, heroic actions that
involve an altruistic element.
The social standing of police officers, firefighters, and soldiers indicates that
many acts recognized as heroic by society do not lose their luster simply
89
because monetary compensation is involved. We generally consider it to be
proper to honor such heroes with both thanks and tangible rewards, including
material compensation. Further, no one maintains we would have more
firefighters saving imperiled children if we resolved to withhold either
approbation or financial compensation.
The fact that heroism and monetary reward are not only compatible, but
frequently coupled, reflects the basic reality of the transactions at issue: Saving
a person in distress at some personal risk is not primarily a financial decision.
This does not mean, however, that financial aspects have no influence on such
choices. Rather, the financial consequences are weighed, along with other
considerations, and the acts are not devalued because compensation is involved.
Monetary rewards to kidney donors need not transform donations into standard
financial dealings, even in the circumstances of cadaveric donation, which are
somewhat less complicated than those of live donation.
Given the centrality of the risk of personal harm in social recognition of
heroic acts, it might be thought that the smaller the risk, the less heroic the
behavior. Perhaps kidney donation is, or will become, safe enough that it could
be construed as a mundane financial transaction. First, however, note that the
risk inherent in a heroic act need not be of a physical nature. The potential for
regret over a serious elective operation, and for complicated social interactions
87. Dorry L. Segev et al., Perioperative Mortality and Long-Term Survival Following Live Kidney
Donation, supra note 49, at 959.
88. See Franco et al., supra note 86.
89. See BEARD, KASERMAN & OSTERKAMP, supra note 11, at 182–83.
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with recipients and others, would still remain even if the direct medical risks of
explantation were eliminated. Second, the mortality risks faced by heroic public
servants such as firefighters, for example, are perhaps more comparable to
those currently faced by living donors than might be imagined. Annual fatalities
per 100,000 full time–equivalent employees in the United States in 2011 were:
2.5 for firefighters, 18.6 for police patrol officers, 25.3 for farming, fishing, and
90
forestry workers, 15.7 for construction laborers, and 19.7 for taxi drivers.
Although driving a cab is evidently far riskier than being a firefighter, and even
somewhat riskier than being a police officer, the public does not ordinarily see
cab drivers as heroes. This difference in perception reflects the altruistic
component inherent in police and firefighter work. Further, the statistics are
consistent with the experimental findings of Douglas M. Stenstrom and Mathew
Curtis, who note that although some risk of harm is necessary to generate wide
agreement that an act is heroic, that degree of harm does not have to be
particularly severe; apparently, “even a low possibility of jeopardy can confer
91
the status of ‘hero.’”
The firefighter (or police, or military) analogy is useful for considering more
92
generally the social response to foreseeable dangers. We know that there is
some chance (even a near certainty, alas) that some of our citizens will face the
horrific circumstance of a burning house, and sometimes, even a burning house
with loved ones inside. We could insist that they handle the situation
themselves, and surely many or most parents, for instance, would brave the
flames to attempt to save an imperiled child. But recognizing this risk, we have
instead set up a system where we use trained (and, typically, paid) professionals,
who are on call to do their best in such grave circumstances. In general, it is
extremely beneficial that this aid is available, that the trained and compensated
professionals can replace those desperate actions of family members that would
otherwise be forthcoming. We do not think of establishing this rescue system as
immoral, as setting up a market in human lives, nor do we think of the
compensated firefighters as engaged in some immoral or irrational act. We do,
however, think of them as heroes.
Some of our citizens face the danger of kidney failure. The system that we
have set up now relies to a significant extent on self-help: on mobilizing friends
and family members to donate kidneys, even when this mobilization can go so
93
far as to cross the line into coercion of directed donors. We could reduce this
reliance by establishing a mechanism, in advance, that would allow willing
kidney donors to be compensated for being a part of the lifesaving transplant
system. We should not think of instituting this rescue system as immoral, or as
90. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfoi_rates_2011hb.pdf.
91. Stenstrom & Curtis, Heroism and Risk of Harm, supra note 85, at 1087 (2012).
92. Sally Satel, Concerns about Human Dignity and Commodification, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T
ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 6, at 63, 70 (refuting the
suggestion that “financial and humanitarian motives reside in discrete realms”).
93. Id. at 72–74.
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setting up a market in human lives, nor should we think of the compensated
donors as engaged in some unethical or irrational act. We should, however,
think of them as heroes.
IV
A MODEL INCLUDING MONETARY COMPENSATION
Although the idea of providing some form of material compensation to
kidney donors actually predates the kidney shortage, specific and detailed
94
proposals for compensation systems are more recent. In many cases, these
plans share key elements, such as establishing payments to living undirected
donors, often with some reliance upon in-kind elements of compensation. Our
proposal also shares such features, and, in some crucial respects, mimics
influential and detailed discussions by authors such as Matas, Becker and Elías,
95
and Cronin and Elías, as well as recent work by one of the present authors.
The principles outlined in part II inform the design and envisioned
operation of the compensated donor-procurement system we propose for the
United States. First, we seek to (greatly) expand the supply of kidneys that are
of appropriate quality and obtained from appropriate donors in an appropriate
environment. Each part of this requirement is critical: Only when the kidneys
procured are of sufficiently high quality, obtained from donors who make
informed decisions, within a system in which donor welfare is strictly protected,
can the system be likely to promote social welfare and to secure broad support.
The “pitfalls” discussed in part II also inform our procurement system’s
architecture. Of importance in this regard is the evidence indicating the
directions and dimensions of substitution behavior between different classes of
donors. As noted in part II, Beard, Jackson, Kaserman, and Kim demonstrate
that increases in cadaveric donors in the United States reduce living donation,
96
with a long-run offset of approximately forty percent. In other words,
expansion of deceased donation suppresses living donation. The converse,
however, does not appear to hold: Cadaveric donations do not fall when live
donations increase.
Donor substitution could escalate under systems involving compensation. In
particular, if compensation were introduced exclusively for deceased donors, as
is done now in Spain, the negative effect on living donation might be even
greater than that found by Beard, Jackson, Kaserman, and Kim for increases in

94. See Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV 811, 812
(1970).
95. See generally BEARD, KASERMAN & OSTERKAMP, supra note 11; Gary S. Becker & Julio
Jorge Elías, Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 2007, at 3; Cronin & Elías, supra note 6; Arthur J. Matas, A Gift of Life Deserves
Compensation: How to Increase Living Kidney Donation with Realistic Incentives, POLICY ANALYSIS
NO. 604, Nov. 7, 2007. Our approach parallels that of Matas rather closely in attempting to maintain as
much of the current system as possible and by regarding donors as heroes.
96. Beard et al., supra note 14, at 273–75.
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97

uncompensated deceased donations.
Broadly speaking, there are three classes of kidney donors: deceased donors
(and their families), living directed donors, and living undirected donors.
Interactions and substitutions among these three groups, which appear likely,
should be accommodated in the design of any system utilizing compensation.
There are advantages and disadvantages connected with all three groups.
Deceased donation lessens most ethical concerns, and enables multiple-kidney
(as well as other-organ) harvesting from a single donor, but does so with
diminished medical effectiveness and the necessity of having in place a costly
system that can respond expeditiously to stochastic organ availability over
broad geographic regions. Living directed donors can be strongly motivated,
but the very strength of that motivation can perhaps involve a coercive element.
Although efforts are made to identify coerced donors, it is hard to separate
intrinsic, perhaps even normal, family pressure from invisible but effective
coercion. For this reason (and others), the extent of living directed donation is
sometimes taken as a measure of failure in the procurement system: Healthy
people feel compelled to provide parts of their bodies to sick relatives because
98
they see no alternatives. Living undirected donors undergo similar medical
risks as living directed donors, but the lack of a personal connection means that
those risks must be recompensed by some combination of warm-glow rewards,
cost reimbursement, and other types of compensation, which also hold the
potential to undermine the rationality of decisions to donate. It is hard to know
the proportions among donor types that would involve the highest social net
benefits, and how those ideal proportions might change as medical techniques
and populations of potential donors and recipients undergo change.
Without a good gauge of social optimality, in the short term it probably
makes sense to achieve a meaningful net increase in donated organs without
inducing the elimination (or substantial diminution) of any donor group. The
significant opposition to compensation (and hence heavy reliance upon otherdirected motives) suggests that particular concerns would attach to the
possibility of living directed donors being suppressed through increased
cadaveric and compensated living undirected donation.
With these preliminaries in the background, the primary characteristics of
our proposal may be summarized as follows:
A. A publicly funded and controlled monopsony will procure all organs, and will be
the sole agent
legally allowed to compensate donors and to distribute organs for
99
transplant. This organization will not be permitted to solicit kidneys, beyond the
provision of the sort of factual information that transplant centers now make available

97. Id.
98. For a discussion, see BEARD, KASERMAN & OSTERKAMP, supra note 11, at 47.
99. In the United States, most dialysis treatment is paid for with public funds, as are most kidney
transplant costs; transplants for most patients save money relative to ongoing dialysis within a few
years. Even $90,000 payments for kidneys typically would result in cost savings relative to dialysis. See
Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A Cost-Effective
Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216, 216 (2003).
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for potential living donors.
B. Organs obtained will be distributed according to existing algorithms.
C. The default position of all persons is that of being a nondonor: Multiple affirmative
steps must be taken to facilitate moving to living donor status, and opt in (or forced
choice) will remain in place for the deceased-donor system.
D. Cadaveric donors (or their families), living directed donors, and living undirected
donors will all receive compensation packages, although they will differ substantially,
in part for reasons of donor substitution. The underlying attitude governing the system
will be that “donors are heroes,” and the compensation will reflect this status.
E. Compensation to donors will consist of a package of benefits and recognition, of
which financial payments, some of them delayed, are but a part.
F. Criteria that must be met for qualification as a donor will be public, and undirected
living donors, in particular, will continue to undergo a rigorous vetting process to
ensure medical and psychological suitability.

Part of the appeal of a monopsony structure is that the existing system, with
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the United Network
for Organ Sharing, is essentially a monopsony. The primary benefits of a publicmonopsony format are (1) transparency and the promotion of public
understanding, (2) ease in ensuring national uniformity in donor-selection and
distribution rules, and, (3) no incentives to compete in ways that would
undermine the quality of matches or suggest commercialization.
Aside from the inexorable deaths of end-stage renal disease patients, the
depravity associated with the black market in organ transplants is perhaps the
most disturbing aspect of the current system. A number of economists and
others studying the organ shortage—Osterkamp, for example—have suggested
that a major consequence of the black market is to undermine the
100
uncompensated-donor system itself. If, one may reason, many donors are
getting paid, why should I donate my own or a relative’s organs for nothing?
From this perspective, the reliance on nonmonetary motives within the official
system leads to a shortage, which creates a black market, which in turn
undermines those nonmonetary impulses, exacerbating the shortage further,
and so on. In contrast, with a publicly funded and operated monopsony, with
oversight boards composed of advocates for patients, physicians, ethicists, and
community leaders, potential donors are far more likely to accept the presented
levels of compensation as accurate indicators of what other donors receive. The
monopsony can, and should, operate with the highest level of transparency,
where the criteria for donor qualification, levels of compensation, and the
algorithms used to distribute organs are all widely accessible.
If, instead, organ-procurement organizations are allowed to compete, it
seems likely that they will react to their circumstances strategically—for
example, by altering their criteria or levels of compensation to obtain an
advantage in donor recruitment, or to receive favorable treatment from
transplant centers. An interest in favoring their own patients could also lead to
100. Rigmar Osterkamp, Presentation at the Western Economic Association Annual Conference:
Why a Shortage of Kidneys Under an Inconsequently Altruistic System May Feed Itself (2006).
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medically inferior matches, although this species of favoritism is possible in the
current system as well. Although rivalry among firms would ordinarily benefit
society (and be welcomed by economists), sometimes the trappings and effects
of commercial rivalry, including advertising and even low prices, do not serve
the social good. There are many “markets” that are tolerated and legal, even
though excessively commercialized versions are not permitted: Dutch coffee
shops and British casinos are two cases in point from the world of vice policy. If
the full genius of modern marketing were to be brought to bear on such
101
markets, their continued legality would be placed in doubt.
Compensated organ exchanges would be, at least at first, in a similar
situation. The existence of an official procurement system able to offer material
compensation to donors is by no means assured. Further, there is an
independent public good, which one might describe as trust, that would be
undermined by the existence of variations in compensation (or other conditions
of donation) or by unrestrained donor recruiting tactics. This negative
externality arises precisely because of the mixed motives involved in organ
donation, where some of the motives might be placed at risk of being
undermined by overt competition—including price competition—among organprocurement organizations.
We propose different packages for deceased donors (or, specifically, their
families), living directed donors, and living undirected donors. The existing
system in Spain can provide some guidance for deceased donations.
Compensation in Spain consists of several thousand euros, offered at the time
102
of death as funeral assistance. The procurement officers have great discretion
in the use of this incentive, but in any event, the compensation is not presented
as “buying an organ.” Rather, survivors are informed that the program, which is
government supported, has funds available to assist families with funeral
expenses in recognition of their loved one’s gift. The potential donors also are
103
presented with ethical arguments in support of donation.
It is hard to identify substantial, concrete risks associated with gently
incorporating such compensation into discussions with family members
concerning a deceased relative’s organs. There might be an abstract uneasiness
associated with “commodification of the human person,” perhaps tied to
slippery-slope reasoning that full-scale markets in body parts will soon ensue.
These highly speculative apprehensions—which seem even less of a threat for
deceased than for living donors—must be weighed against the high likelihood
that financial incentives will be effective in procuring additional deceased-donor
104
organs.
101. See JIM LEITZEL, REGULATING VICE: MISGUIDED PROHIBITIONS AND REALISTIC
CONTROLS 264–65 (2008).
102. David Rodríguez-Arias, Linda Wright & David Paredes, Success Factors and Ethical
Challenges of the Spanish Model of Organ Donation, 376 LANCET 1109, 1110–11 (2010).
103. For a description and analysis of the Spanish approach, see generally id.
104. Cf. BEARD, KASERMAN & OSTERKAMP, supra note 89, at 181–82 (attributing the U.S. surplus
of cadavers to the “funeral assistance” payments made to families).
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Living directed donors can be expected to persist in significant numbers
under any procurement system that produces recurrent shortages. The
motivation of such donors—saving a family member or close associate—is
extremely durable. However, as the substitution results of Beard, Jackson,
Kaserman, and Kim show, these decisions are not immutable: Evidently many
people are reluctant to undergo directed donation unless they feel it is quite
105
necessary. That feeling of compulsion now varies with the level of deceased
donation. Thus, the potential exists for compensation-induced increases in
cadaveric donation to undermine living directed donation. Increases in living
undirected donation can be expected to reduce directed donation for similar
reasons.
Living directed donors engage in a selfless, praiseworthy act—although their
strong personal interest in the organ recipient adds a self-regarding element to
106
their behavior. To encourage such acts, and to counter the potential
substitution effect arising from increased deceased donations, living directed
donors should receive a compensation package that includes financial
recognition, along with health-related reciprocal benefits, such as follow-up care
and subsidized insurance.
Living undirected donors present the most exacting challenge to the design
of a compensation package. They represent the category of donor for whom any
undesirable effects of financial compensation are of the greatest concern.
Already, a small but rising group of people donate to unrelated patients,
even without financial compensation. Utilizing U.S. data up to 2008, Julie Lin
and coauthors find that “[u]nrelated (non-spousal) living kidney donation
107
increased from 1% in 1987 to >20% in the years since 2003.” It seems
improbable that these generous persons would refrain from donating in the
108
event that financial assistance became available. It is possible, however, that
small payments would put off more live donors than they encourage: The extent
to which donation would serve as a public signal of self-sacrifice would be
109
undermined by small payments. Even if the public signal is unaffected, the
personal image of undertaking a good deed might suffer from compensation,
despite the potential for donors to redirect payments to charity. The lesson here
is to offer more than token financial recognition to ensure that compensation
bolsters supply.
Substantial payments avoid the problem of reducing live donations, but
compensation that is “too high” presumably leads to problems of another type,
105. See Beard et al., supra note 14, at 263–64.
106. But see the discussion of the potential for intrafamily coercion. Supra text accompanying notes
60–69.
107. Julie Lin et al., Longitudinal Trends and Influence of BMI Mismatch in Living Kidney Donors
and Their Recipients, 43 INT’L UROLOGY & NEPHROLOGY 891, 893 (2011).
108. We assume all money payments can be redirected to a charity of the donor’s choosing.
109. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 791, 791–
92 (2000); Carl Mellström & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss
Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 845, 845–47 (2008).
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that of encouraging purely money-motivated donors. Critics of compensation
often suggest that a main concern with monetary compensation is that the poor
will end up being parts suppliers to the rich; that, being poor, they will be placed
in a coercive situation, and that sellers will attempt to pose as more healthy than
110
they are to qualify for donation. The extent and timing of monetary payments,
and their position within the larger ambit of donor benefits, can be designed to
allay some of these fears.
The compensation provided to donors of any type will be composed of a
package of benefits and corresponding recognition. In the case of living
undirected donors, benefits such as follow-up medical care, health-insurance
subsidies, incentives to participate in ongoing research on the consequences of
donation, and life insurance, will comprise an important and perhaps majority
part of the overall package. Acknowledgement, private or public, of the
praiseworthy act of donation will also continue to be a feature of the transplant
111
system.
A number of authors and commentators have speculated on the likely
magnitude of financial compensation necessary to substantially increase living
112
undirected donation. Current black-market prices are not a reliable guide, of
course, because these exchanges take place without access to contract and tort
law, and in environments that are not protective of donor interests. One
approach involves economic calculations based on pricing risks of donor death,
reduced quality of life, and lost employment time. Utilizing such an approach,
Becker and Elías suggest that the United States could produce an effectively
113
inexhaustible supply of living donors for about $15,000 each. An alternative
approach involves the assumption that large numbers of new donors only would
become available if compensation would be of sufficient magnitude to make a
qualitative difference in a person’s life chances. A number of German
transplant officials have conjectured that, for healthy young people in
Germany, perhaps as much as €80,000–100,000 would be necessary to induce
sufficient donations, because such a sum would allow for starting a business,
114
buying an apartment, and so on. This notional figure might well be accurate
for Germany, but it seems more would be required to end the flow shortages (at
least for the near future) in the United States.
110. See generally Francis L. Delmonico & Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Why We Should Not Pay for
Human Organs, 38 ZYGON 689 (2003); David J. Rothman, Ethical and Social Consequences of Selling a
Kidney, 288 JAMA 1640, 1640–41 (2002).
111. In Iran, which allows compensated kidney donations, recipients as well as compensated and
uncompensated donors are invited to an annual celebration held in recognition of the transplant
participants. SIGRID FRY-REVERE, THE KIDNEY SELLERS: A JOURNEY OF DISCOVERY IN IRAN 89
(2014). Poor kidney recipients have some of the recompense to the donors covered by charitable
organizations. Mitra Mahdavi-Mazdeh, The Iranian Model of Living Renal Transplantation, 82 KIDNEY
INT’L 627, 632 (2012).
112. See, e.g., BEARD, KASERMAN & OSTERKAMP, supra note 11, at ch. 8.
113. Becker & Elías, supra note 95, at 11.
114. This view was widely expressed at the workshop on the organ shortage at CESifo Group,
Munich, Germany, June 2007, in private conversations with the first author.
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Recognizing its highly speculative character, we suggest a total payment of
around $50,000 for living undirected donation; this monetary component would
be combined with other benefits (including life and health insurance) which
would be worth tens of thousands of dollars. Further, we propose that the
$50,000 be back-loaded: perhaps $25,000 at the time of the transplant, and then
$5000 per year for the subsequent five years. The delay can discourage people
who only consider donating because of pressing monetary problems. Further,
the ongoing annual payment can help ensure that donors remain in contact for
medical and psychological follow-ups. The value of such follow-ups, already
meaningful, will be enhanced when compensation is introduced, because there
currently is little directly relevant information on medical and psychological
outcomes under compensated living donation.
Living directed donors would presumably receive much lower monetary
compensation, perhaps $10,000 total, combined with the medical and insurance
benefits. Again, this monetary acknowledgement can be back-loaded.
Cadaveric donors (or, more specifically, their families) would probably respond
strongly to additional compensation in the $5000 range for multiple organs,
based on Spanish experience and the U.S. system for whole-body cadaveric
donation. All of these figures, if remotely accurate, imply that expanded
transplantation will save many billions of dollars each year in foregone dialysis
costs. The gains in the length and quality of life for those who receive the
115
incremental transplants, of course, would be even more significant.
Regret over donation, which is an infrequently reported condition, might be
116
more of a worry with compensated undirected donors. Information provision
and donor screening can help to remedy this problem, but a “cooling off”
period—between the time the decision is made to pursue donation and the
donation itself—may also be helpful. Prospective donors must be given many
opportunities to opt out in an honorable fashion. The necessary medical tests
automatically provide some of this time buffer, but there is a case to be made
for purposely augmenting the delay to ensure the commitment of donors.
Fortunately, this issue is not arising ex nihilo. The current system for dealing
with uncompensated, living undirected donors has had to ensure that “[t]he
person who gives consent to be a donor should be competent, willing to donate,
free of coercion, medically and psychosocially suitable, fully informed of the
risks and benefits as a donor, and fully informed of risks, benefits, and
117
alternative treatment available to recipient.” The guidelines that have been
115. Richard A. Epstein, Altruism and Valuable Consideration in Organ Transplantation, in WHEN
ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 6, at 79, 91
(providing some rough calculations indicating a social gain of more than $2 million per patient from
replacing dialysis with a transplant).
116. Márcia Fátima Faraldo Martinez Garcia, Luis Gustavo M. Andrade, and Maria Fernanda C.
Carvalho examined fifty consecutive directed donors in a Brazilian hospital. All fifty of the donors
rated their experience as positive, and would choose to donate again. Garcia et al., supra note 53, at 9
(2013).
117. F.L. Delmonico & M.A. Dew, Living Donor Kidney Transplantation in a Global Environment,
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developed and implemented for uncompensated, living undirected donors seem
to be directly relevant for compensated donors, too.
Consider, for instance, the experiences of a Swedish transplant center, and
the subsequent recommendations, as reported in Annette Lennerling, Ingela
118
Fehrman-Ekholm, and Gunnela Nordén. The center undertakes no active
119
recruiting of undirected donors. A person who contacts the center is given a
telephone interview, with the procedure and the risks explained therein. If the
prospective donor is not yet ruled out, materials are mailed. The person must
then make a second proactive decision to contact the center. Medical tests and
interviews ensue, followed by another appointment, more tests, and interviews.
If the prospective donor’s case is accepted at a board meeting, the individual is
given three months to reconsider. After the three-month cooling-off period, the
would-be donor must again be proactive in contacting the center; if the person
does not make contact, the case is dropped without further communication. If a
transplant does ensue, anonymity is maintained between the donor and the
recipient, with an eye to reducing the potential psychological strain on the
120
recipient.
At the time of the Lennerling, Fehrman-Ekholm, and Nordén report, of
forty-three initial contacts, only four were accepted by the center, and one of
these candidate donors did not get back in touch after the three-month waiting
121
period. The remaining three candidates provided donations. The ongoing
evaluation of the procedure, undertaken by the team at the transplant center,
developed the suggestion only to accept donors at least thirty years old, and to
apply two elements of their scheme for assessing undirected donors—the
122
psychiatric appraisal and deep social evaluation—to directed donors, too.
It is hard to see how this rigorous procedure to identify suitable donors
would need to be altered if donor compensation were added to the mix. In the
United States, transplant centers already include an “Independent Living
123
Donor Advocate,” whose mission is to protect the interests of living donors.
Advocates oversee the donation process in concert with the psychologists and
others tasked with evaluating the donor’s mental health and motives. Those
donors who persist through the multistage process would be very unlikely to
experience regret as usually conceived. Further, potential donors could be
required to attend workshops with previous living donors who could frankly
71 KIDNEY INT’L 608, 609 (2007).
118. Annette Lennerling et al., Nondirected Living Kidney Donation: Experiences in a Swedish
Transplant Centre, 22 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 304 (2008).
119. Id. at 304–05.
120. Id. at 306.
121. Id. at 305. The Philippines, which has a national system for undirected donors, also screens out
the vast majority of potential donors. See M.N. Manauis et al., A National Program for Nondirected
Kidney Donation from Living Unrealted Donors: The Philippine Experience, 40 TRANSPLANTATION
PROCEEDINGS 2100, 2101–02 (2008).
122. Id. at 307.
123. See J. Steel et al., A National Survey of Independent Living Donor Advocates: The Need for
Practice Guidelines, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2141, 2141 (2012).
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discuss their experiences. As mentioned before, the “default option” is that
everyone is a nondonor unless and until they act affirmatively.
Nothing in the proposals given here would require any fundamental change
in the organ-allocation algorithms. In fact, a greatly expanded supply of organs
would increase the average quality of matches, reduce second transplants, and
partially relieve physicians of the weighty responsibilities associated with
rationing life itself. The current algorithm gives some points to a nonmedical (in
fact, contra-indicated) characteristic, time on the waiting list, in deference to
fairness. This too could continue. With more transplants, the agonizing problem
of identifying the best rationing algorithm will diminish.
Although we believe that financial compensation, used correctly and in the
proper spirit, can save thousands of lives and billions of dollars, care must be
taken in any transition. For example, if we introduce compensation to all three
classes of donors simultaneously (as we recommend), the time period between
the announcement and actual implementation will tempt some living directed
donors to wait to donate until the benefits package becomes available. Thus,
some number of transplants will be postponed, and this is medically inadvisable,
125
even if feasible given continuing dialysis for the potential recipient. Similarly,
it will be necessary to decide what role donor-consent rules would or could play
in a system with deceased-donor compensation. These are not trivial issues, but
are probably not serious enough to delay implementation of an otherwise
desirable compensatory system.
Michele Goodwin has suggested that compensation be studied through trials
126
using the various U.S. states as laboratories. This suggestion is fully consonant
with long-term practice in the Medicaid program, where states often are given
some flexibility to experiment with new delivery mechanisms, wellness
127
programs, and the like. It is reasonable to consider such a decentralized
course for compensated-donor trials; however, we have some reservations
about this idea, despite its obvious merits. In particular, if states differ in their
compensation packages, with some offering more than others, and many
offering nothing, one can envision a “migration” of potential donors in response
to the “arbitrage opportunity” presented by “price dispersion.” The use of these
economic terms-of-art is intentional: Such variation leads to explicitly economic
124. The National Kidney Foundation recommends that would-be donors contact (through their
transplant center) previous donors (and recipients) prior to donating. See Helpful Tips for Living
Donors and Caretakers, NATIONAL KIDNEY FOUNDATION http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/
livingdonors/infotips.cfm (last visited Jun. 24, 2014).
125. This sort of strategic reaction is impossible in the case of the family of deceased donors
because the donation window is too short.
126. Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Federal Organ Transplantation Policy: Incentives Best
Implemented by State Governments, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR
COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 6, at 111, 112. See also Sally Satel, Joshua C. Morrison,
& Rick K. Jones, State Organ-Donation Incentives Under the National Organ Transplant Act, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 217.
127. See generally KIMBERLY J. MORGAN & ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, THE DELEGATED
WELFARE STATE: MEDICARE, MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL POLICY (2011).
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calculations that may well undermine support for the enterprise. In much the
same way that T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman, and Rigmar Osterkamp
argue that each country should limit donors to its own citizens, we suggest that
if separate state systems are employed, the compensation packages should be
128
standardized across them all.
Finally, in implementing a reform that includes valuable consideration for
organ donors, it might make sense to simultaneously pursue or experiment with
some measures that aim at reducing the long-term demand for kidneys.
Conditions such as hypertension and obesity that lead to diabetes are
particularly implicated in the demand for kidneys. Increased attention to these
prequels can pay off down the road. As Beard, Kaserman, and Osterkamp note,
“Although not all dialysis patients are reasonable candidates for
transplantation, it is not too misleading to say that every potential [end-stage
renal disease] patient who is eliminated by preventive measures is as socially
129
valuable as a living kidney donor.”
V
CONCLUSION
“[A]n uncertain hypothesis cannot justify a certain evil unless an equal evil
130
is equally certain on the opposite hypothesis.” —Bertrand Russell
The introduction of monetary compensation, as a tool for use by organprocurement officers in concert with many others, is at once both a major
reform and a small step. It is a major reform because, until now, although we do
cover some expenses and even offer some forms of valuable consideration, we
have not allowed monetary payments for those who generously donate organs.
Any payments that are introduced will form an important element of the
overall package of benefits, recognition, and thanks offered to donors. Much of
the total compensation, however, will be in the form of health services, life
insurance, and similar benefits that reflect reciprocity, as well as respect for the
donor and his or her welfare.
The use of compensation is at the same time a very small step. In current
practice, people donate organs from many motives: to help a loved one, to show
gratitude to physicians one respects, to make an example of helping to others in
one’s circle, and so on. The life experiences of the potential donor and his
family, their treatment by the medical establishment, and their financial
circumstances can all inform this choice. The monetary supplement will be a
further inducement to those individuals for whom the idea of donating an organ
is inherently attractive. Payments will not generally be so high, or so immediate,
as to attract persons (and have them process through the multiple screens) who
are financially desperate, or who otherwise find the transaction repugnant.

128. BEARD, KASERMAN & OSTERKAMP, supra note 11, at 204.
129. Id. at 115.
130. BERTRAND RUSSELL, Philosophy for Laymen, in UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 21, 29 (1950).
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As part of the recognition of a heroic act, monetary compensation allows
society to validate the donor’s decision in a meaningful way. We attempt to
provide such validation under the current system, but we are strictly limited in
our available means. As a result, we induce far below the “socially optimal”
number of kidney transplants—a number that is well approximated by the
length of the waiting list. To move us closer to the social optimum, we need to
offer further inducements to donors. This article makes some specific proposals
about how to do that, and monetary compensation is included among the
inducements. Perhaps this proposal, or similar ones, or maybe any proposal that
involves monetary compensation, has serious shortcomings—but we will not
131
know for sure unless we try them. The claims of large ethical or other costs
associated with any (increase in) monetary compensation to donors are based
on “an uncertain hypothesis.” Unfortunately, we do know the “certain evil”
that the status quo will bring: thousands of people in the United States dying
every year because they did not procure a kidney that, on average, would have
given them many additional years of a quality life.

131. And when those trials reveal errors, they can be corrected, or the trials can be reversed.

